terriko: (Default)
New post up at Web Insecurity but since it's short, you get the whole thing here:


Now, I haven't verified this at all, but here's an interesting link for you: Ankit Fadia / Manu Zacharia - "Network Intrusion Alert" Heavily Plagiarized.


An extremely detailed analysis has been performed for the first chapter (10 pages) to show the scope and method of plagiarism. Our analysis shows that roughly 90% of the first chapter, including the six graphics used, has been taken from other sources. Due to time constraints, notes are used for brevity for the rest of the material.


Given my experiences with plagiarism among my undergraduate students and the recent Cooks Source plagarism story (which attracted quite a lot of attention)... I'm sadly inclined to believe that this entire book may be plagiarized.

What's funny about this story is that the book in contention here is titled "Network Intrusion Alert: An Ethical Hacking Guide to Intrusion Detection." Emphasis mine.
terriko: (Default)
Some fun recent stuff:



And then some more sad stuff in the form of a round-up of the links I've seen lately about women leaving academia. Poignant for me given that I've got a contract that'll take me away from academia... although I'm actually leaving mostly for the "work that has impact" reason and not so much for the others.

And then one thing that I didn't write (but I wish I had):

Let's say that fighting sexism is like a chorus of people singing a continuous tone. If enough people sing, the tone will be continuous even though each of the singers will be stopping singing to take a breath every now and then. The way to change things is for more people to sing rather than for the same small group of people to try to sing louder and never breathe.


Isn't that just the way of it? Thanks Mary for sharing that one.
terriko: (Default)
Short post up on Web Insecurity about a hilariously, brutally honest privacy policy. An excerpt from the policy:


So just to recap: Your information is extremely valuable to us. Our business model would totally collapse without it. No IPO, no stock options; all those 80-hour weeks and bupkis to show for it. So we’ll do our very best to use it in as many potentially profitable ways as we can conjure, over and over, while attempting to convince you there’s nothing to worry about.


You can read the whole policy here or you can read my summary and commentary on Web Insecurity.
terriko: (Default)
Yesterday, I talked about why end-users don't care about security and how that actually makes a certain amount of sense for them since the cost of behaving more securely can overwhelm the cost of an actual breach.

However, what I didn't talk about is whether this is true for companies. A single security breach in a single user account maybe doesn't cost a company much, but if breaches get common enough that they start losing users, it could be a problem with a much higher cost.

While users trying to protect themselves from curious folk with firesheep are counseled to use a VPN, website owners can choose to do encryption right from their end using SSL. But it was thought that SSL was computationally costly and even environmentally costly due to the supposed need for extra electricity and machines.

But who's been looking at what those costs actually are?


Read the rest at Web Insecurity
terriko: (Default)

Engineer Gary LosHuertos decided to try Herding Firesheep in New York City: He sat down in a Starbucks, opened up his laptop and started gathering profiles, then sent messages to people whose facebook accounts he could access warning them of the security flaws. Some people closed up and left, but some just ignored his message and went on with their day. Confused, he sent another message, but they just didn't seem to care and continued using their accounts.




He was appalled that people, even when warned, would ignore a security flaw, but it's actually well known that people reject advice. The interesting part of the story comes with Cormac Herley's paper "So Long, And No Thanks for the Externalities: The Rational Rejection of Security Advice by Users" -- it turns out that it makes perfect sense that people refuse to do security things, and fixing the flaws that firesheep draws attention to is just another example of where security advice just isn't worth following.

You can read the full version of this post on Web Insecurity: Apathy or sensible risk evaluation: why don't people care about security?
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